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What is the effect of trade liberalization on households in developing countries? To what extent do the 
poor benefit when local markets are made more accommodative to international trade? I empirically 
analyze the distributional impact of trade policies on households in a low-income country with a large 
rural economy where labor markets are imperfect. The methodology proposed in this paper, which can 
be applied to various types of labor market conditions, relates changes in prices attributed to trade 
reforms to changes in household welfare, income distribution and poverty using theoretically 
consistent measures of producer and consumer welfare. I investigate the effects on poverty and 
income distribution of national and international market integration in Vietnam’s rice sector and 
fertilizer market between 1993 and 1998, a period of ongoing market reforms when the national 
poverty rate fell sharply from 59% to 37%. I find that when the effects of opening the rice and 
fertilizer market are isolated, Vietnam’s agricultural trade reforms did not contribute to a significant 
improvement in overall household welfare or decline in poverty over this period. Nonetheless, the 
liberalization exercise can explain about half of the reduction in poverty incidence among farm 
households. The results also show that liberalization did not exacerbate income inequality, but did 
generate gains for rural households across the distribution, particularly the poor, at the expense of 
urban households.  
 
Keywords:  trade liberalization, imperfect labor markets, non-separability, shadow wages, welfare, 
farm income inequality, rural poverty, Vietnam. 
 
JEL No:   F14, F16, O24, Q12 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3541, March 2005 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even 
if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be 
cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of 
the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
 
                                                 
I am grateful to John Mclaren, Eric Van Wincoop and John Pepper for their guidance throughout this project. I 
thank without implicating Sanjay Jain, Quy-Toan Do and seminar participants at the University of Virginia.  
1 World Bank and Department of Economics, University of Virginia, P.O Box 400182, Charlottesville, VA 






















































































































How does trade liberalization affect household welfare? Who gains and who loses as 
national markets are opened to trade? In particular, what happens to poor households when 
developing countries liberalize their economies? In spite of considerable debate on the impact 
of trade reforms on living standards, there is limited empirical work examining the 
distributional effect of trade liberalization in a low-income country with a large rural economy. 
Prior studies, mainly on middle-income countries, have focused on urban labor markets and 
only recently on urban poverty
 2. When rural economies are examined, with the exception of a 
few studies, most confine welfare estimates to first-order responses,
3 while ignoring labor 
market repercussions. All of them assume complete labor markets, which is harder to justify in 
a rural economy where high transaction cost, underemployment and seasonal work are 
prevailing features.  The purpose of this paper is to examine changes to household welfare, 
inequality and poverty in Vietnam induced by actual price changes attributed to trade 
liberalization in the rice and fertilizer market between 1993 and 1998, in a setting with 
imperfect rural labor markets. 
 
Between 1993 and 1998, Vietnam experienced a period of ongoing market and trade 
reforms which saw real rice prices rising over 30 percent and the real prices of mainly 
imported chemical fertilizers, a key farm input, declining by 18 percent on average. Rice is the 
single most important source of income for the majority of Vietnamese as well the main staple 
in their diet. Benjamin and Brandt (2004) find that most of the increase in real rice prices was 
due to international and national rice market integration. To a large extent, the increase in 
domestic rice prices is due to relaxation of a rice export quota, which by 1998 was no longer 
                                                 
2 Looking at a recent survey of trade liberalization in developing countries by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), one 
finds that most studies of trade liberalization episodes look at wage inequality in the manufacturing sector in 
Latin America. As the authors point out, while this focus may not be a concern in studies of trade reform on 
urban sectors in middle income countries, only a small share of the population in poorer economics participate in 
labor markets as wage earners. Recent works on urban poverty are by Porto (2003) on Argentina and Nicita 
(2004) on Mexico.   
3 These first-order responses, popularized by Deaton (1989) are only suited for small price changes. The 
production response of producers to price changes are considered more significant that the substitution behavior 
of consumers. Only a few studies have considered second order responses, such as Ravallian and Van De Walle 
(1991) for Indonesia and Minot and Goletti (1998) for Vietnam. Both studies were ex-ante analysis with 





4. Internal restrictions on rice trade which prevented rice produced in the south from 
being traded in the north of Vietnam were also lifted in 1997
5. Import quotas on chemical 
fertilizers were also relaxed over this interval. Poverty rates fell sharply from 59 percent to 37 
percent over this interval, leading some to attribute this remarkable outcome to global 
integration
6. Income inequality rose, driven mainly by differences between urban and rural 
areas
7. Over 80 percent of Vietnam’s population in 1993 resided in rural areas and were 
engaged primarily in agricultural work, making the analysis of their welfare pertinent in 
learning about rural poverty. The distinctive feature of this paper is the availability of a 
household panel dataset that spans a period of agricultural trade reforms in Vietnam between 
1993 and 1998. The use of panel data arguably allows for a much better identification of the 
effects of trade liberalization on household welfare.  
 
The approach used in this study goes beyond existing work in four different 
dimensions.  First, I consider welfare and poverty outcomes among urban and  rural 
households. Second, actual price changes are used instead of simulated or hypothetical 
changes seen in other studies. As Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) observed, the degree of price 
changes varies across regions which implies that geographically dispersed households will be 
affected differently by trade liberalization
8. Third, household welfare measures consistent with 
utility maximizing and profit maximizing behavior are computed as opposed to relying on 
producer and consumer surplus approximations. These welfare measures include second-
order responses by producers and consumers in reacting to changes in rice and fertilizer 
prices. Fourth, in analyzing the farm household, I depart from the usual assumption of 
complete labor markets which allows for separability between household labor demand and 
supply decisions. Household members face binding constraints in seeking off-farm 
                                                 
4 The export quota on rice was eliminated in 2001. 
5 A major land reform took place in 1993 where tenure security was extended and households were given the 
right to exchange, transfer, lease and mortgage land. A land titling process was initiated and by 1997, almost half 
of all land was titled, affecting two-third of households. However, according to Benjamin and Brandt (2004) 
most of the changes took place towards the end of the period, and probably did not have sufficient time to be 
reflected in production and output behavior.  
6 Dollar (2004) is the clearest proponent of the view that ‘globalizing’ countries like Vietnam reaped the benefit 
of poverty reduction, through the export of rice and labor intensive products such as footwear, without a 
significant change in income inequality. 
7 Several inequality measures lead to the same conclusion. The Gini index rose from 0.329 to 0.352. The Theil T 
measure increased from 0.2 to 0.23. See Glewwe, et.al (1999) for a discussion on inequality in Vietnam. 
8 The price transmission mechanism is likely more important in low-income countries where local markets face 




employment, due to labor market failures and therefore work intensively on their own farm
9. 
This raises the need to account for the implicit value of family labor, which I do.  Using 
market wages will overstate the cost of family labor, thereby understating the welfare 
estimates.  
 
In terms of methodology, I begin by estimating structural parameters of a multi-output 
production function using the household panel dataset from which the marginal revenue 
product or shadow wage of family labor is derived. This approach avoids the need to form 
prior assumptions about prevailing labor market conditions and includes separability as a 
special case. A profit function based on the underlying multi-output production function is 
constructed to evaluate the response of farm profits to changes in output and input prices. In 
doing so, I also consider the general equilibrium reaction of shadow wages to changes in rice 
prices. This allows me to isolate the impact of higher producer rice prices and lower fertilizer 
prices attributed to external liberalization on a farm household’s profitability, which is then 
combined with changes in their consumer welfare, measured using compensating variation. 
The general nature of this methodology permits its application to non-farm households as 
well. To my knowledge, this is the first study of the distributional consequences of trade 
reforms to incorporate an explicit analysis of shadow wages in determining the profitability of 
farmers in a rural setting with imperfect labor markets. 
 
The results show that rural households across the income distribution benefited from 
the liberalization exercise, with lower-income rural households gaining proportionally more.  
The rural poor clearly gained while urban households, particularly the poor, were at a 
disadvantage with rising rice prices, though their welfare loss was marginal. The gains were 
more evidently seen in households with large holdings of farmland. Inequality of farm income 
rose slightly and while I find that agricultural trade reforms can explain nearly half of the 
decline in poverty among farmers, the impact on the overall poverty rate for Vietnam was 
modest. This outcome necessitates caution in attributing liberalization in the rice sector and 
fertilizer as contributing significantly to poverty reduction in Vietnam.  
                                                 
9 See Benjamin (1992) for a fuller discussion on non-separability between labor supply and demand. Jacoby 
(1993) and Skoufias (1994) develop an approach to determine the implicit wages for households who are not 





The next section describes the methodology used to measure welfare changes facing 
Vietnamese households over the reform period. Section 3 discusses the dataset and empirical 
implementation of the welfare concepts introduced in Section 2. The resulting welfare 
measures are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 examines the robustness of the results using an 
alternative price measure and poverty dominance concepts and Section 6 concludes.     
 
2. Measurement of Welfare Changes 
 
According to Winters (2002) in his survey of linkages between trade reforms and 
poverty, trade policies operate primarily via price changes. The direct effect of trade 
liberalization on households would be through change in prices that reach them. The impact 
of a price change on household welfare depends on whether the household is a net producer 
or net consumer of the good or services in question
 10.  
 
An appropriate framework to address welfare changes affecting households in 
Vietnam, the majority of which are involved in agricultural activity, is to recognize that these 
households make joint decisions regarding consumption, production and labor allocation. The 
literature has developed models suited to the study of farm households
11, which is the primary 
feature in Vietnam. However, most empirical studies have relied on assuming there are 
perfectly competitive markets for labor and other inputs and outputs. Family and hired labor 
are treated as perfect substitutes, there is no disutility from working off farm and there are 
ample off-farm job opportunities. This allows labor supply and demand decisions to be 
separable, where a farm household initially decides on how much labor is needed to maximize 
profits from agriculture without considering its leisure or consumption preferences. Given 
farm profits, market prices and wages, the farm then decides on how much to consume and 
                                                 
 
10 I do not examine the extent to which price changes at the borders due to trade liberalization are actually 
transmitted to the household. This would depend on several factors, notably the structure of distribution sector, 
the way in which government institutions such as marketing organization operate and whether goods are traded 
at the local, regional, national or international level. A 2003 World Bank study did find that farm-gate prices are 
80 percent of border prices for rice and that rice farmers capture as much as 82 percent of the profits from the 
value chain running from producers to exporters.  




how much labor to supply. Under separability the market wage provides an exogenous 
measure of the value of time for family labor, irrespective of whether they work on or off 
farm.  
 
Off-farm employment opportunities are limited in Vietnam, in part due to the 
seasonal nature of work, the communist legacy of self-subsistent farming particularly in the 
north
12, the absence of state support for rural enterprises, underdeveloped rural physical 
infrastructure and lack of access to marketable skills, capital and credit
13. Among farm 
households in 1993, only 12.4 percent of the total hours worked by family members is spent 
earning wages, with the fraction of time spent in the market being higher in the south at 16.6 
percent compared to the north at 9.5 percent
14.  Additionally, is unlikely that family labor and 
hired labor can be treated as perfect substitutes due to transportation and monitoring cost. 
Only 30% of farm households hire labor though the southern regions, particularly the 
Mekong River Delta, employ more casual farm labor than the north.  
 
If labor markets are imperfect, household production and consumption decisions can 
not be treated as separable, as their labor supply choices are no longer independent of labor 
demanded on the family farm and vice versa. Instead of the market wage, it is the ‘shadow 
wage’ that determines labor supply and demand choices for the farm household.  The shadow 
wage, being the marginal (revenue) product of labor, is further determined within the 
household and is a function of household preferences, technology and all other fixed input 
and market prices affecting household choices. This approach avoids the need to make any 
                                                 
12 There are seven agro-economics zones or administrative regions in Vietnam. The north includes the Northern 
Mountains and Midlands, the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast. The south is made of the South 
Central Coast, The Central Highlands, the Southeast and the Mekong River Delta. The two most important rice 
production regions include the Red River Delta (15% of national paddy output) and the Mekong River Delta 
(50% of national output). 
13 See Van de Walle and Cratty (2003) for a discussion on constraints facing the non-farm market economy. 
14 40 percent of farm households in 1993  have members who work in the market, with the South providing 
proportionally more market opportunities, where 48.5 have market work compared to 34 percent in the North. A 
similar picture emerges with hired in labor where on average only 30 percent of farmers in Vietnam employ 
casual labor. The South employs far more with 54 percent of farmers hiring in labor, whereas only 14.1 percent 
of North farmers hire agricultural workers.  While there is an active labor market, more so in the South where 
households both hire and sell labor, slack season and underemployment are predominant features of rural labor 
markets. The small fraction of time spent by farm households working in the market provides some evidence in 





assumptions about the state of labor markets, and nests separability of labor decisions as a  
special case. 
 
To motivate the empirical work, I use a stylized farm household model drawing on 
work by Benjamin (1992) and Jacoby (1993). Assume that households consume two 
commodities: an agriculture good, c valued at price  p  and leisure,l. Household members 
allocate their time endowment, T  between leisure, l, working on farm,
F z and market work, 
m . The market wage for off-farm work,  ) (p w
M  is a function of the price of the agriculture 
good. The farm household uses both family and hired labor 
H z , no longer considered as 
perfect substitutes and land,
D v , a fixed input to produce output,q which is sold at price  p . 
The concave production technology is described by  ) , ; , ( Φ
D H F v z z q  where Φ is a vector of 
household characteristics such managerial ability and years of experience, as well as weather 
and soil conditions affecting production.  Hired workers are also paid the market wage, 
M w . 
With these specifications, the households choose  m z c
F, ,  and 
H z so as to  
 
(  1 )      ) ; , ( max B l c u  subject to  
 
(  2 )      ( ) g z m p w v z z pq pc
H M D H F + − + = ) ( ) , ; , ( Φ  
     T m z l
F = + +  
      H m ≤ ≤ 0   
 
where  B  is a vector of individual and household characteristics affecting preferences, g is 
endowment income and H is the maximum number of hours that  a household may work off 
its farm. 
 
  The first-order condition for this problem has each household equating its marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, or shadow wage, either to their market 




the work ration is not binding, their shadow wage will equal the market wage received in the 
market, i.e.  






= ≡ , where 
S w  is defined as the shadow wage rate.  
 
  Household members supply labor on their farm until their marginal products are equal 
to the market wage. Beyond this, their marginal revenue product will decline due to 
diminishing returns and they will instead resort to market work. Alternatively, if the household  
chooses not to hire out labor to the market but prefers to work on the family farm, then the 
shadow wage, which is given by the marginal revenue product of family labor, must exceed 
the market wage,  
 
( 4)       
M
z
D S w pq v p w F > = ) , ; ( B Φ, . 
 
  However, if household members want to work in the market, and the desired labor 
supply exceeds the sum of available off-farm work, measured by H  and on-farm labor 
demand, then the family will work on its own farm for additional employment. The shadow 
wage, being a function of exogenous price,  p will now be lower than the market wage,  
 
(5)      
M
z
D S w pq v p w F ≤ = ) , ; ( B Φ,  , when  H m =  is binding. 
 
In both the previous cases, preferences for leisure enter into the farm labor demand 
decision, and labor supply is determined by the agriculture technology. The decision not to 
participate in the labor market or the inability to find sufficient formal work leads to a 
household budget constraint that is non-linear in hours worked. As Jacoby (1993) and 
Skoufias (1994) stated, the gradient of the budget constraint at the optimum is just the shadow 
wage where  F z
S pq w = . Each household will have its shadow wage level determined uniquely 
by the data. At this point, the constraint is linear. The ‘full income’ of the household  at the 





(  6 )      g v p w p w p T w y
M S S + + = ) , ); ( ), ( , ( Φ π  where  
F S H M D H F
z z z p w z p w v z z pq Max H F ) ( ) ( ) , ; , (
, − − = Φ π , 
 
 where π  is the “shadow” farm profit, with the opportunity cost of family labor accounted 
for.  The budget constraint evaluated at the optimum can be rewritten as 
 
(  7 )       y l w pc
S = + , 
 
where the expression on the left-hand side is the value of total household expenditure on 
goods and leisure and the right-hand side expression,  y  is  the ‘full income’. The shadow 
wage is used to value leisure and time endowment. The budget constraint states that the 
expenditure on all goods including leisure cannot exceed the full income, which is the sum of 
farm ‘shadow’ profits, value of time endowment and non-labor, non-farm income. The utility 
function in (  1 ) can now be maximized subject to (  7 )  yielding the same first-order 
conditions discussed earlier.  
 
Evaluating the change in full income in response to changes in the output price 
involves estimating the response of profit and the change in the value of time, as the shadow 
wage is affected by the output price changes. The value of time is a product of the shadow 
wage and total time endowment, T . Once shadow wages are accounted for, households can 
be treated as price takers, using shadow wages as an input price.  
 
2.1 Welfare Measure 
 
 
The welfare impact of price and income changes on households can be measured in 
monetary terms by using money metric indirect utility measures. Using a set of reference 
prices, it can be determined how well or worse off households are, moving from their initial 
utility level to the new or post-reform utility level in response to price changes, while 
accounting for their factor shadow wage response to price changes. If the post-reform price 
level is used, the measure of net welfare gain, WG  is given by the difference between two 
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where the term  ) , ( u E p   gives the minimum cost of achieving the utility level  h u  for the set 
of prices denoted by the vector  p  facing the household and CV is the familiar indirect utility 
measure of compensating variation, which is the amount of money which the household 
would need to be given at the new set of prices in order to attain their pre-reform initial level 
of utility. Subscripts refer to before (0) and after (1) prices changes which corresponds in this 
study to 1993 and 1998 respectively. The change in net welfare or real income is the change in 
full income less compensating variation. A positive sign indicates an improvement in welfare 
and vice-versa. Using a general form of the full income term in equation (6) and dividing by 
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Therefore the welfare gain to farm households is the change in the sum of the value of 
time endowment and shadow profits in response to price changes less compensating variation. 
The remaining subsections look at each of these components in greater detail with attention 
paid to the nature of data for Vietnam. Attention will be restricted at the household level to 
exogenous changes in consumer and producer price of rice (or paddy)  directly and indirectly 
through the latter’s effect on endogenous shadow wages and on exogenous changes in 







2.1.1 Time Endowment  
 
To examine the change in the value of time endowment for a farm household, the 
shadow wage is required, which is derived from an underlying production function. As 
Vietnamese farmers are observed producing multiple crops, I follow Strauss (1984) in defining 
an implicit production function of the form  ) ; , ( v z q F where q is a vector of outputs, z is a 
vector of variable inputs and v is a vector of quasi-fixed inputs. This is justified by the 
parsimony in parameters that is achieved in contrast to assuming separate production 
functions for each output. In addition, the VLSS datasets do not adequately break down the 
input use by crops
15.   
 
  Among the possible functional forms to use for inputs is the Cobb-Douglas (CD)
16.  
For outputs, the counterpart of the constant elasticity of substitution is the constant elasticity 




) ( ∑ = i iX X H  where  0 > i γ and  1 > σ  to insure convexity.  The constant elasticity of 
transformation between outputs is  ) 1 /( 1 − σ . The CD function for inputs can be written as, 
 





















) exp( ) , ( ϑ κ γ
θ α
σ
σ v z , and therefore,  
where  ht Q  represent an index of agricultural outputs produced by farm household h in year 
t, κ  is a term capturing productivity,  jht z  is the quantity of variable input  j  used by farmer 
h in year t,  kht v  is the quantity of quasi-fixed input k  and the disturbance term is given by 
ϑ . The production system is normalized such that ∑ =1 i γ . By maximizing output revenue 
with respect with one unit of the output index,  ) 1 ( = h Q , it can be shown that output shares, 
                                                 
15 For this study, the possible outputs are paddy, other food crops, annual crops, perennial crops and fruit crops. 
There are five variables inputs, namely family labor, hired labor, organizer fertilizer, chemical fertilizer and 
insecticides. Fixed inputs are cultivated land and capital.   
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i i p P  with output price of commodity i given by  i p . 
 
The marginal product of family labor or shadow wage, 
S w , suppressing the disturbance term 
and subscripts for household and time, can then be derived as: 
 








= ) , ; , ( B Φ, v w(p) p , 
where 
F α  is share of family labor in used in production of all outputs, which will be 
empirically estimated and 
F z  is the total annual hours of own-farm labor by family members 
observed in the data. Note that the shadow wage is a function of exogenous output prices, 
input prices - some of which respond endogenously to changes in the output price such as the 
agricultural market wage, the production technology and household characteristics.   
 
  Since I’m interested in isolating the effects of changes in paddy price on the shadow 
wage, a reduced form Mincerian type regression for the shadow wage equation will be 
estimated which will contain crop output and input prices except for market wage for casual 
labor (which is a function of output prices) and include other farm and household 
characteristics. If done in logs, the elasticity of the shadow wage with respect to the producer 
price of rice, 
p




sr p w ln / ln ∂ ∂ = δ , where  sr δ  is the estimated coefficient in 
front of log paddy price
17. A rise in the price of paddy is expected to raise the demand 
schedule for family labor, therefore the shadow wage will have to rise to re-equate household 
labor supply with demand
18. 
  
                                                 
17 This elasticity incorporates the endogenous response of market wages to the price of rice. 
18 It is possible there will be an offsetting negative effect on the shadow wage due to higher market wages for 
hired labor in reaction to increased rice prices. Farmers may substitute away from more costly hired labor and 
into family labor, lowering their marginal product. This effect if any, is less of a concern in Northern Vietnam 
due to the insignificant presence of hired labor on household’s farms. However, the more prominent role of 





  Having obtained the elasticity of shadow wage to rice paddy price, holding all other 
variables constant, the change in the value of time endowment facing the household can be 
given by, 
 









































2.1.2 Shadow Profit  
 
Once the shadow wage is determined, it can be treated as the input price of self-employed 
farm family labor. The maximized variable profit function at the household level is therefore, 
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σ γ   
  
with respect to  i q ’s and variable inputs  j z ’s. Input prices are denoted by  j w  and include the  
shadow wage rate, 
S w . 
 
The profit maximizing output supply and factor demand equation are given by: 
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θ κ . 
 
In general, with j number of variable input  jht z  and k number of quasi-fixed inputs, 
ht v , the maximized  profit function takes the expression: 
 
(  16 )        V AWP a
a) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( ) ; , (
− − = v w p π  
 
To get at the change in shadow profits, I first determine the percentage change in 
household’s farm profits, π ~ in response to an exogenous change in the rice paddy price and 
chemical fertilizer price while taking into account the indirect impact on the shadow wage and 
market wage for hired labor,  
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F α δ α δ α
π , 
 
where  ∑ = j a α is the sum of variable input shares in the production technology, 
c w  is the 
price of chemical fertilizer,  r δ  is the elasticity of shadow wages with respect to rice paddy 
price,  mr δ  is the elasticity of market wages for hired labor with respect to paddy price
19, and 
F α , 
HL α  together with 
C α are parameters for family labor, hired labor and chemical fertilizer 
shares respectively in the production function. Lastly,  0 ρ  are initial output prices of crops 
other than rice paddy and similarly,  0 ω  are initial input prices other than chemical 
                                                 
19In preliminary work, attempts to estimate a reduce form agriculture market wage equation at the commune level 
as a function of crop prices and other control variables led to insignificant results. This is likely due to the small 
sample size as markets are assumed to clear at the commune level. For future work, I intend to explore this 




fertilizer and the shadow wage rate. Recall that the subscripts (0) and (1) refer to 1993 and 
1998 prices respectively. The corresponding change in profit levels is then given by 
0 ) ~ 1 ( π π π + = ∆  where  0 π  is the level of variable profits in 1993, derived by subtracting 
variable cost from the value of production. 
 
2.1.3 Compensating Variation  
  
  For the compensating variation term in equation ( 9), I follow Minot and Goletti 
(1998,2000) in taking a second order Taylor expansion of an expenditure function with respect 
to consumer rice price, 
c
r p  which after dividing through with initial income,  0 y  gives, 
 
































where  0 0 0 / y x p CR r r r =  is the value of rice consumption as a proportion of initial household 
income (expenditure) ,
c




r p p − 1 , the change in consumer rice price from period 
0 to period 1 and  the own-price compensated Hicksian elasticity of rice demand is given by 
H







η η η + =  where  M
rr η  is the uncompensated or Marshallian price elasticity of 
demand for rice while M
ry η  is the corresponding income elasticity.     
 
3. Empirical  Analysis 
 
  The empirical work for this paper relies on the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
dataset (VLSS) for 1993 and for 1998 which forms a 4,300 household panel data
20, covering 
                                                 
20 A total of 4800 households were surveyed in 1993 while 6000 households were surveyed in 1998 of which 
4300 were the same households from 1993. No sampling weights were needed for 1993 since it was considered a 




150 communes and spanning the period of export rice quota change. Both household surveys 
include detailed questions on household composition, the labor activities of adults and 
children, education, expenditure, land holdings and agricultural activities.  
 
Unlike most household surveys in developing countries, the Vietnamese Living 
Standard Surveys also include a community price questionnaire. The VLSS 1993 dataset had 
120 rural and 30 urban communes which mostly carried over to the 1998 survey
21. In each 
commune where households were surveyed, price data were collected on a variety of mainly 
food and household items
22.  
  
According to Justino and Litchfield (2002), commune prices (i.e. prices recorded in the 
community price questionnaire) should more accurately reflect prices faced by households as 
communes usually have a single market where most households purchase similar goods at the 
same prices. For these reasons, the empirical results in this paper will use commune rice prices 
taken from the community price questionnaires as the price measure. As a check of 
robustness, the findings will be contrasted with results obtained from the use of median rice 
unit values measured at the commune level.   
 
Table 1 presents the percentage change in consumer and producer rice price as well as 
chemical fertilizer price between 1993 and 1998 for Vietnam and after deflating by the 
monthly price index with January 1998 as the base. Rice prices were taken from the 
community price questionnaire. Due to incomplete data for fertilizer prices, I used unit values 
derived at the commune level to create a composite fertilizer price index from the household 
surveys. There are noticeable regional variations in the degree of change observed. Northern 
Vietnam saw both producer and consumer prices rising relatively less compared to the south. 
This is probably due to the fact that paddy and rice prices were comparatively much higher in 
the north in 1993 due to an overall rice-deficit position and that market integration over this 
                                                 
21 In total, there were approximately 10,000 communes in Vietnam in 1993, each with an average population of 
6500. 
22 In the absence of price data, welfare studies for developing countries rely on computing unit values, which are 
‘prices’ derived by dividing expenditure or revenue by quantities bought or sold. The usual concern raised with 
unit values is that they are choice variables and are affected by problems of quality22 and are also likely to 
measured with error. However, Deaton and Zaidi (2002) suggest that unit values may provide good price 




period has caused a convergence in paddy prices
23. Chemical fertilizer prices, fell on average 
by 18.3 percent, declining relatively more in the North.  
 
The following sub-sections elaborate on the empirical approach to account for the 
consumption and relevant farm production components of the Vietnamese household. 
 
3.1 Consumer Welfare Estimates 
 
On the consumer side, the approximate second order compensating variation term as 
a fraction of initial income, resulting from changes in deflated consumer rice price between 
1993 and 1998 is computed using equation (  18) with price and income elasticities of rice 
demand taken from Minot and Goletti (1997). These uncompensated, consumption-weighted 
averages of regional elasticities are shown in the first two columns of Table 2
24. Returning to 
Table 1, the first column provides the change in deflated consumer rice prices over the 5 year 
period for the seven regions using commune prices taken from the VLSS commune level price 
questionnaires. On average, consumer rice prices went up by 31.2 percent for Vietnam with 
the highest increase of 42.2 in the Central Highlands and the lowest rise of 17.7 percent in the 
Northern Uplands.  
 
The resulting compensating variation term is presented in Table 3.  The burden of 
higher consumer rice prices fell mainly on rural households and on the poorest (1
st quartile) of 
households. Curiously, the Northern Uplands and Mekong River Delta (MRD) experienced 
similar decreases in welfare despite prices rising by twice as much in the MRD (36.5 percent 
compared to 17.7 percent).  The Northern Uplands is the poorest region in Vietnam while the 
MRD has the second largest per-capita income after the South East region. This translates 
into higher rice budget shares for the population residing in the Northern mountains 
compared to the MRD, so why were their losses proportionally low? It appears that though 
compensated price elasticity of rice demand is lower in the North perhaps due to the lack of 
                                                 
23 The ratio of real paddy or producer farm-gate prices using commune prices between north and south Vietnam 
was 0.88 in 1993 and it rose to 0.98 in 1998. 
24 Consumer demand for rice is more price sensitive in the south compared to the north. Lower incomes in the 
north, and therefore a larger share of northern household food budget allocated to rice appears to contribute to 




close substitutes, the relatively smaller increase in rice prices of 17.7 percent help reduce the 
welfare cost to households in the Northern mountains despite allocating 33.7 percent of their 
total expenditure to rice consumption. In the Mekong Delta by contrast, a combination of 
higher compensating price elasticity, which allowed households to substitute out of rice more 
easily, and higher per capita income, which kept the share of rice budget low at 22.2 percent, 
contributed to relatively lower welfare loss.  
 
  Figure 1 shows a nonparametric
25 regression of the compensating variation as fraction 
of initial income in 1993 against per capita expenditure in 1993. The two vertical lines denote 
the 25 and 75 percentile of the per capita expenditure distribution. The downward sloping 
schedules further reinforce the findings in Table 3 where lower income groups are seen 
bearing the burden of higher consumer rice prices. 
 
3.2 Production Function Estimation and Household’s Shadow Wage Rate 
  
As modeled in Section 2, the lack of off-farm employment opportunities implies that the 
implicit cost of family labor on the farm cannot be evaluated at the market wage rate. Since 
their internal wages are unobserved, the initial step in the empirical analysis of production 
behavior is to obtain estimates of the shadow wages or marginal productivity of family labor. 
This is achieved by first estimating a CET-CD production function described by equation ( 
10). Taking logs, the production function to be estimated is given by,   
(19)    ∑∑ ∑ ∑
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ih ih ht q Q  ,  jht z  is the quantity of variable input  j  used by farmer h in year 
t,  kht v  is the quantity of quasi-fixed input k . I include additional controls where  D is a 
vector of location dummies and topographic variables representing commune-specific 
                                                 
25 All non-parametric regressions in this study use a bi-weight kernel density estimator with a bandwidth of 0.6.  
Weights for the bandwidth take on an inverted U-shape that declines to zero at the band’s edges. See Deaton 




characteristics, which affect output such as temperature and topology but are unobservable by 
an econometrician.  Also added is a vector of household head’s characteristics,  X  in order to 
capture managerial effort. The disturbance term is given by ϑ . Equation (19) is non-linear in 
the parameter space of the dependent variable. However, if a suitable value for σ  is chosen, 
the output share value  ∑
− − =
i
i i i i i i i p q p p q p
σ σ σ σ γ
1 1 ) ( / ) (  can be obtained and the farmer’s 
output index,  ht Q  can be constructed. 
 
A common concern with estimating agriculture production functions is the presence 
of simultaneity bias that may arise if random influence on output causes farmers to vary the 
level of inputs. These shocks are unobserved or unmeasured by the econometrician. One 
example of a shock is that an anticipated drought may cause a farmer to use less labor for 
harvesting. In this case  z  and ϑ  are correlated thereby violating a condition for consistent 
estimation using OLS. However, shocks such as unusual weather conditions or pests attacks 
which are unanticipated by the farmer can be assumed to be independent of largely 
predetermined inputs such as land, and hence uncorrelated. Other influences include time-
invariant farmer’s ability and soil quality, which again will cause inputs to be correlated with 
the error term. The availability of panel data may partially control for the endogeneity of 
inputs if it is assumed that the disturbance term is composed of three main sources of 
variation, that is: 
 
ht t h ht ε τ µ ϑ + + = . 
 
The term h µ  is the farmer’s fixed effect capturing time-invariant farmer specific 
heterogeneity such as managerial ability or soil characteristics, t τ  is a year effect common 
across all farmers in a given year
26 and  ht ε  is a an error introduced by omitted time-varying 
variables, measurement, functional form misspecification
27, data collection and computational 
                                                 
26 In Vietnam, this would help capture the possible incentive effect from increased land tenure security with the 
passage of the 1993 land law. 
27 This would include unmeasured capital components, unmeasured effort variables, input quality such as land, 




procedures. It is assumed that  ht ε  has zero mean and constant variance, is uncorrelated over 
time and with all included regressors. Given these assumptions and after including a time 
dummy to control for the year effect  t τ  the choice of estimator for the production function is 




This section describes data used to estimate the production function specified in 
equation (19). Observations are based on a panel of 3205 farm households over two years, 
1993 and 1998
28. The output index consists of five commodity groups, namely paddy, other 
food crops, annual crops, perennial crops and fruit crops. The five variable inputs included in 
vector  jht z  are annual hours of adult equivalent
29 family labor, annual hours of hired labor, 
and annual amount in kilograms of chemical fertilizers, organizer fertilizer and insecticides 
used. Fixed inputs are cultivated land and capital stock. Additional controls for management 
input are dummies for households with female heads, years of farm experience and education 
level of the household head. This assumes that the household head is the primary decision 
maker on the family farm.  
 
To construct the farm output index, a producer price for each commodity group is 
needed. With the exception of paddy price that is taken from the commune price 
questionnaire, the remaining price indices are constructed at the commune level by first 
deriving the unit value
30 of an item in a group by using commune farm gate sales revenue and 
total quantity sold. Then each price or unit value of an item in a commodity group is weighted 
by the total regional sales revenues for that item to form the commodity group price index. 
When communes do not produce a particular crop, its price is imputed using the average 
                                                 
28 There were 3748 agriculture households in 1993, of which 3365 cultivated rice. In 1998, there were 4207 farm 
households of which 3504 had rice cultivation.  
29 Instead of relying on calorie intakes which the literature usually does, the total (male) adult equivalent hours  is 
instead created by scaling hours worked by female adults, children between the ages of 6 and 15 and elders above 
the age of 64 using  commune level agricultural market wage ratios. The ratio of adult female to male wage was 
0.85, child to adult male wage was 0.65 and elder to adult male wage was 0.5. These ratios were surprisingly 
consistently across both years. 
30  With the exception of paddy prices which is used in the empirical work, the community price questionnaire 




regional value in which that commune is located and weighted using regional sales value. The 
value of σ  is set at 1.1 to minimize the root mean squared error term.
31  
 
Land is measured as the total area harvested
32. For capital stock, the total market value 
of the market value of draft animals, tools, machinery and farm equipment was deflated by the 
monthly commune level consumer price index with January 1998 as the base month.   
Numerous empirical studies on the agriculture market point to the need to adequately control 
for land quality, whereas neglecting it may lead to omitted variable bias in the regressions. 
Though the VLSS data does not provide measures of soil quality and rainfall, the surveys have 
categories for land quality and measures for area irrigated
33. To address unobserved 
heterogeneity across communes, all regression specifications include commune level dummies. 
 
Given the nature of agriculture production, the role of weather or natural shocks is 
expected to play an important role. Though rainfall data are absent, the community 
questionnaire has information on natural disasters that led to crop losses such as floods, pests, 
drought, typhoons and other factors. Variables that measure the number of times these events 
led to over 10% crop losses during the year are considered together with a dry season 
dummy
34. Additional inputs that may contribute to raising productivity are also included such 
as the real value of government services for land preparation, irrigation, plant protection and 
land protection and the real value of private services, which cover renting animals, renting 
equipment/machinery, maintenance and repair, gasoline and electricity.  
 
All independent variables in the regression are in logarithmic form with the exception 
of farm experience, measures of natural shocks and location dummies. In the presence of 
                                                 
31 The variables share estimates using the CET output index with σ=1.1 were similar to those obtained using real 
total output as the dependent variable in the production regression. I also intend to estimate the value of σ  using 
non-linear techniques in future work.   
32 This is based on the assumption that farm size is a quasi-fixed input. This can be justified by incomplete or 
non-existent land markets though farmers can rent or sharecrop land even in the absence of land sales. However, 
rental markets are thin in Vietnam. Reforms to land laws in 1993, which was initiated after the 1993 survey, 
permitted farmers to hold land under long-term contracts. Even after 5 years, only 15% of farmers rented-in or 
sharecropped land in 1998, hence it is not unreasonable to view farm size as fixed. 
33 In addition to using fixed effects to control for unobserved land quality, a number of interaction variables 
using fraction of area irrigated and percentage of good and poor quality land33 are used in an attempt to capture 
variation in land quality across farms.   




inputs with zero values, the logarithmic transformation was carried out by adding one to all 





Table 4 presents the OLS, random effects and fixed effects estimates of the coefficient 
of the production function. The results are similar across all three specifications. Yet, the 
presence of unobservable household characteristics and land quality render the random or 
fixed effect specification more appropriate. The Hausman test which is a test to determine a 
consistent estimator firmly rejected the random-effects specification in favor of the fixed-
effect estimation
35. This suggests that the fixed-effects specification is preferred as it controls 
for unobservable farmer specific effects that are correlated with the observed inputs.  
 
The coefficients for hired labor, chemical and organic fertilizer, insecticide as well as 
area cultivated and capital stock are significant across all specifications at the 5 percent level.  
Poor quality land negatively affects output, though this effect was only significant under 
random and fixed effects estimation, while land of higher quality raises output, though the 
latter coefficient was only statistically significant with the fixed effects specification. Female-
headed households have lower outputs levels compared to their male counterparts, though the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in the fixed-effects estimation.  This probably reflects 
higher variation between households then within households, which is expected, as it is 
unlikely that many households would change heads within the 5-year interval. Years of farm 
experience contributed positively to raising output and are significant at the 10 percent level or 
below across each specification. Under pooled and random effects,  the coefficient on 
household head’s education attainment  beyond some upper secondary schooling generally 
rose with attainment levels, with university providing the highest returns
36.  Also, with weather 
                                                 
35  The null hypothesis test is whether the difference in coefficients are not systematic between the fixed-effects 
and random effects estimations.  It was rejected with a chi-squared value of 160.25 
36 Among the education attainment dummies, heads with some upper secondary school, completed upper   
secondary and having attended university are statistically significant in the pooled and random effects regressions. 
Despite lacking statistical significance, the similarity in outcome between vocational and lower secondary school 





related measures, the dry season had a negative and statistically significant impact on 
production for all specifications. 
 
The coefficient for family labor is significant in all specifications, though the 
magnitude is lower with fixed-effects. The presence of measurement error can bias variables 
towards zero, which is further aggravated when fixed-effects are used. To test this possibility, 
the fixed-effects regression is estimated with instruments for family labor. As regional 
differences are likely to matter in the production of crops, separate regressions are run for 
north and south Vietnam. Following the literature, the typical instruments that are correlated 
with family farm labor input are the number of household members divided into various age 
categories. The possible set of instruments in this study are the number of children (6 to 15 
years), young male and females adults between the age of 15 and 24, adults between 25 and 64 
years old and elders. Given that there is more than one instrumental variable, a test of 
overidentifying restrictions is conducted under the null hypothesis that the chosen instruments 
are orthogonal to the error term and can therefore be validly excluded from the regression.  
 
The first stage regression and corresponding fixed effect production function for 
North and South Vietnam are provided in Table 5. All instruments used
37 in the first stage 
regression are positive and significant at the one percent level. The test of overidentification 
for both regions strongly did not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error terms.  The fixed effect coefficient value for instrumented family labor was similar for 
both regions. Hired labor was excluded from the North Vietnam regression as initial tests 
produced negative and statistically insignificant results, which is not surprising given the 
limited role of hired labor in the northern regions.  
 
The shadow wage rate or marginal revenue product of family labor for household h 
in year t is derived with expression (  11) using the parameter estimate of family labor share in 
production and the predicted value of output based on the instrumented fixed-effects 
specification, together with the observed adult equivalent hours of annual farm work
38. Table 
                                                 
37 The final set of instruments were the number of young male adults, the number of male and female adults 
between 25 and 64 years old. 
38 For 503 ‘out-of-sample’ farmers in 1993, I use the product of actual production value with the estimated 




6 shows the ratio of the estimated shadow wages to the market daily (male) adult wages for 
casual agriculture labor in 1993 and 1998.  At 0.2 ,The average ratio for Vietnam was very low 
and similar for both years, though it rose in the south in 1998. The low ratio is indicative of 
limited off-farm employment opportunities that results in intensive work effort on the family 
farm. Smaller farms will have higher labor intensity, produce more output per area, but have 
lower labor productivity, consistent with a lower shadow wage
39. This outcome is borne in the 
data where the ratio of shadow to market wages rises with farm size. Though paddy prices 
rose over this 5 year period, which should have raise overall shadow wages, the average hours 
spend in own-agriculture work in adults equivalent terms increased from 3,131 to 3,463, 
dampening the rise in household’s shadow wages.   
 
3.3 Response of Shadow Wages to Changes in Rice Prices 
 
  Higher crop prices should lead to an increase in agricultural wages
40 and benefit casual 
workers. The landless rural poor who are net suppliers of labor would gain or at least be able 
to mitigate the higher cost of food consumption. For this paper, I estimate the impact of 
higher rice prices on the shadow wage rate, which indirectly accounts for the effect of rice 
prices on agriculture market wages
41. Family labor is the abundant factor used in the 
production of rice, though its factor price is unobserved.  
To isolate the effect of higher paddy prices on the shadow wage rate, a reduced form 
regression for equation (  11) similar to a Mincerian wage equation is used with controls added 
to capture demographics and household characteristics. Instead of using annual hours of 
family labor, 
H z  which is endogenous to the household, I include instead household 
composition variables, using the set of instruments considered for the production function. 
These are expected to impact negatively on shadow wages, since the marginal product of 
                                                 
39 This is known as the ‘inverse relationship’ between farm productivity and farm size which is usually observed 
in developing country agriculture. As Benjamin and Brandt (2002) notes, only a few studies have econometrically 
estimated the degree to which the inverse relationship varies with factor market development. 
40 In a simple 2 factor-2 goods framework, opening up to trade is expected to raise by even a larger percentage 
the factor price of a relatively abundant factor used intensively for a good in which a country has a comparative 
advantage as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
41 I am currently working on estimating the impact of higher crop prices, in particular paddy prices on individual 




family labor should fall, exhibiting diminishing returns with greater hours working on the 
farm, which is likely to be highly dependent on the household size. 
The shadow wage regression takes the following log form, 
(20)   ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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S
ht w  is the previously constructed adult equivalent shadow wage rate for household h 
at time t,  it p  is the commune price of commodity group i which are paddy, other food, 
annuals, perennials and fruit crops,  j w  is the price of variable input for fertilizers and 
insecticides measured using commune level unit values,  kh v  is the quasi-fixed input, namely 
cultivated land and capital stock,  m D  represents demographic variables and  ht X  measures 
household characteristics and composition. Like the production function, separate regressions 
are run for North and South Vietnam to account for regional differences. 
Results 
 
Given the role of unobserved variables, the choice is between using random effects or 
fixed effects specification for the shadow wage regression, with the Hausman test favoring the 
latter.  Table 7 displays fixed effect estimates for North and South Vietnam. The estimated 
coefficients for output prices are positive and generally statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level or below, with the exception of other food prices in both North and South and fruit 
prices in the South. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for chemical fertilizer price is 
positive for both regions. Household composition variables are all negative as expected and 
statistically significant at the 5% level and below. The larger the household size, the greater the 
annual hours of farm work - the lower the marginal product of labor and hence the shadow 
wage.    
 
Focusing on paddy prices, the coefficient for North Vietnam which measures the 
elasticity of shadow wages with respect to paddy price,  sr δ  is positive and highly significant 




that higher paddy price raises the demand for family labor, and therefore increases their 
shadow wage
42. As the impact of change in paddy price was statistically insignificant in the 
south, I will only utilize the elasticity of shadow wages with respect to paddy price for the 
north when calculating the impact of higher paddy prices on profitability.  
 
3.4 Farmer’s Profitability 
 
In this section, the impact of changes in paddy and chemical fertilizer prices on 
farmer’s shadow profits is derived. The overall rise in real paddy price and decrease in real 
chemical fertilizer price are expected to lift farm profits, though the indirect impact of higher 
paddy prices on shadow wages will dampen the increase.   
 
Turning to second column of Table 1, real producer paddy price across Vietnam 
increased on average by 33.4 percent over this period.  The largest rise of 42.2 percent was in 
the Central Highlands, where rice growing is relatively more commercialized and the lowest 
increase of 17.7 percent was in the Northern Uplands region, where rice is planted mainly for 
subsistence.  
 
Table 8 provides the percentage change in real farm profits computed using equation 
with (17) using 3 scenarios, to highlight the relative importance of the paddy price, shadow 
wage and fertilizer price change effects. The first scenario looking at profit changes in 
response to paddy price holding constant shadow wages and chemical fertilizer price.  The 
second incorporates the indirect effect of shadow wages on profitability holding fertilizer price 
fixed and the third looks at the full effect of rice and chemical fertilizer price changes, 
including the endogenous impact through the shadow wage response. 
  
Under the first scenario, farm profits rose on average by 61.4 percent for Vietnam as a 
result of rising paddy prices between 1993 and 1998, holding all other variables constant.  
                                                 
42 It is possible that the limited presence of hired labor in the North, allowed a greater role for the effect of 
higher labor demand in  response to rising paddy prices to raise the shadow wage rate for family labor. In the 
South however, the response of market wages to increased paddy prices, may have raised the hours for family 
labor input as farms substituted away from more expensive hired labor, thereby lowering the marginal product of 
labor. The negative coefficient implies that this effect outweighed the positive impact of rising paddy prices on 




Incorporating the effects of shadow wages in the second scenario reduced profitability of 
Northern farmers by 5.1 percentage points relative to the first scenario. Finally, the third 
scenario builds on the second scenario by including falling chemical fertilizer prices. Relative 
to the first scenario, overall farm profitability was higher by 7.6 percentage at 69 percent.  
 
Across all three scenarios, southern farmers saw profits rising higher by nearly twice as 
much compared to their northern counterparts. This could be attributed to rice farming being 
more commercialized in the south as opposed to the predominance of subsistence farming in 
the north. Rural profits rose relatively far more compared to urban farmers. The percentage 
change in profits in general increased with farm size.  Dividing by income groups, no clear 
pattern could be discerned, though the richest, i.e., those in the fourth income quartile saw 
profits rising the most by 74.5 percent when the full effect of liberalization of the rice sector 
and fertilizer market is considered.   
 
Figure 2 displays a non-parametric regression of the change in real profits as a 
percentage of initial income (expenditure) in 1993 against (log) real per capita household 
expenditure in 1993. The initial level of variable shadow profits in 1993,  0 π  for each farm 
household is obtained after subtracting the cost of hired labor, chemical and organic 
fertilizers, insecticides and the implicit cost of family labor, valued at the shadow wage rate 
from the total value of harvest or production. The additional farm profits due to rising paddy 
price and declining chemical fertilizer price slightly altered the distribution of farmer’s income 
as measured by the Gini coefficient, raising it from 0.49 to 0.52.  This lends support to 
Glewwe et.al (1999) finding which stated that agriculture income did not significantly 







                                                 
43 The authors find that agriculture income while representing 42 percent of total income, accounts for only 17 
percent of overall income inequality. In fact income from household enterprise, accounts for nearly half of 




4. Overall Household Welfare and Poverty Effects of Rice Changes 
 
This section combines producer and consumer welfare estimates previously obtained 
to determine the net welfare position of Vietnamese households after liberalization of the rice 
sector and chemical fertilizer imports. This leads into an assessment of trade reforms on 
poverty rates.  
 
As initial income,  o y  is actually measured using household total expenditure
44, which 
excludes the value of leisure, equation ( 9) is modified by subtracting the value of leisure from 
the change in ‘full’ income as seen in the numerator. Restricting our attention to exogenous 
changes in paddy and fertilizer price, this then becomes, 
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The results are shown in the first three columns of Table 9. The first column present 
overall averages for each category while the second column and third column displays 
averages for the poor and non-poor households respectively. Poor households are defined as 
those whose per capita expenditure is below the general poverty line determined by the World 
Bank based on the VLSS datasets
45 which is set at 1,790,000 VND in January 1998 price after 
deflating by monthly and regional price.  
 
For Vietnam, the process of liberalizing rice and chemical fertilizer markets over the 5 
year period results in an overall increase in household welfare by 9 percent as shown in 
column one of Table 9. Households in northern Vietnam had their real incomes rising higher 
as a fraction of initial income than in the south. On a regional basis, the poorest Northern 
Uplands saw the greatest rise in welfare by 11.6 percent while the richest South East region 
experienced an increase of 1.9 percent. As anticipated, urban households who are net buyers 
                                                 
44 Total household expenditure is the sum of expenditure on durable and non-durable items, including imputed 
rent, utilities, medical and educational expenditure as calculated by the World Bank. The final value is deflated by 
monthly and regional price indices with January 1st, 1998 as the base year.  
45 This is based on food expenditure yielding approximately 2052 calories per person per day and non-food 




of rice, faced a marginal drop in their real income of 1.5 percent compared to an increase in 
welfare experienced by rural households of 11.7 percent. Poor urban households, as seen in 
column two, were unable to cope with rises in rice prices compared to their rural counterparts. 
In fact, it is poor rural households who saw the highest improvement in welfare at 12.7 
percent of initial real income. 
 
Households headed by males saw their welfare improve by 9.9 percent while female-
headed households still gained but at a lower rate of 6.5 percent. More conspicuously, the 
distribution of gains was clearly differentiated by holdings of farmland. Non-farmers saw a 
drop in their welfare by 3.6 percent, with the landless poor experiencing the largest decline of 
6.7 percent. On the other hand, households with farm sizes over 2.5 hectares enjoyed a rise in 
their welfare by 17.8 percent. On the whole, the liberalization process left rural households 




Given the interest of policy makers on the impact of various liberalization efforts on 
poverty rates, it is instructive to examine the impact of the rice sector liberalization on poverty 
incidence. The last three columns of Table 9 show the effects of the liberalization on the 
poverty headcount ratio, defined as the fraction of the population below the World Bank 
general poverty line, for different categories of households.  The actual poverty rate in 1993 
and 1998 are provided together with the predicted rate (2
nd last column) after isolating the 
effect of agricultural trade reforms
46.  
 
For Vietnam, the change in the overall poverty rate attributed to agricultural trade 
liberalization improved by nearly 7 percentage points, falling from 59.7 percent to 52.7 
percent, which can be compared to the 22.3 percentage point decline in observed head 
poverty count between 1993 and 1998. In line with the small welfare declines experienced by 
                                                 
46  Additional poverty measures are shown in Table 10 which includes the poverty gap ratio (P1) and poverty 
severity ratio (P2). The poverty gap which reflects the depth of poverty, declined from 19.7% to 9.5% over the 5 








Given that reforms addressed in this paper were targeted at the agricultural sector, 
farmers were better off with their average poverty rate falling by 9.6 percentage points from 
68.7 to 59.1 percent. This can be contrasted against the 20.5 percentage points decline in 
actual poverty headcount observed among farmers over the 5 year interval. Hence 
liberalization of the rice and fertilizer market can explain close to half of the observed fall in 
poverty incidence among households engaged in agricultural work over the reform period.  
 
5. Robustness Check  
 
The direct effect of trade liberalization on households is seen through price changes. 
The results in this paper establish that Vietnamese households experienced a real income gain 
of 9 percent with liberalization of the rice sector and fertilizer market with rice prices taken 
from commune level price questionnaires. As a check of robustness, the outcomes can be 
compared against those obtained with an alternative measure of rice prices, namely median 
unit values derived at the commune level
48 as stated in Section 3. Both consumer and 
producer prices measured with unit values, appropriate deflated, rose by 18.1 percent between 
1993 and 1998. 
 
Figure 3a shows a non-parametric regression of the ratio of welfare gain to household 
expenditure in 1993 on per capita expenditure in 1993 for Vietnam. Results are presented 
using commune prices and unit values. The outcomes with both price measures are 
qualitatively similarly, though the magnitude is relatively larger when commune prices are 
utilized
49. In both cases, middle income households, which comprise the majority of 
                                                 
47 On a regional basis, consistent with the decline in real incomes, poverty incidence fell the most in the Northern 
Uplands, by 9.3 percentage points, with the smallest decline in the South East. Turning to the quartile section, 
13.8 and 13.5 percent of mainly rural households, located in the second and third income quartile respectively 
rose above the poverty line.  
48 The median unit value was derived for each commune in the data by first computing unit values for each 
household in the commune, then extracting the median value. This was considered to be more appropriate than 
using the average, in mitigating the influence of outliers. 
49 On average, the welfare gain for Vietnam was 1.55 percent with unit values. Tables showing compensating 




Vietnamese households experienced positive gains in welfare. Figure 3b shows that rural 
households across the distribution are better off with the liberalization exercise, with poorer 
households benefiting proportionally more as a proportion of their initial real income. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 display contour and surface plots of the distribution of welfare gains 
across households measured using commune prices and unit values respectively. Both figures 
are similar and show that the vast majority of Vietnamese households are concentrated in the 
middle-income range, as indicated by the vertical bi-variate density axis. Combining this 
observation with those derived from Figure 3a and 3b, it can be concluded that most 
Vietnamese households with the exception of urban households experienced a positive gain 
from liberalization of the rice and fertilizer market.  
 
Overall Poverty Assessment 
 
Measures that evaluate changes in poverty status such as the headcount ratio depends 
arbitrarily on the choice of poverty lines
50. Instead of relying on any particular poverty line, an 
alternative and more robust technique is to use what the literature terms as poverty dominance 
analysis. Take two distributions, A and B. Using a plot of cumulative distribution function, if 
the distribution of A lies below B over the range of relevant poverty lines, it can be concluded 
that the poverty headcount ratio in A is less than B, that is distribution A exhibits poverty 
dominance (or first order stochastic dominance) over distribution B
51.   
 
Turning to Vietnam, figures 6A and 6B compare the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of predicted per-capita expenditure for panel households after the price changes 
against the initial per-capita expenditure in 1993 using commune price and unit values 
respectively. Rather than looking at the entire distribution, the distribution is shown for 
plausible poverty lines between 1,000,000 VND and 2,000,000 VND.  For comparison, the 
CDF for per-capita expenditure in 1998 is also provided which clearly lies below the 
                                                 
50  According to Justino and Litchfield (2003), the two most common poverty line for Vietnam, are those 
estimated by the World Bank and the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA). For 
MOLISA, it is 750,000 VND and 1,080,000 VND in 1998 VND terms, for rural and urban households 
respectively. 




distribution for 1993, implying an unambiguous decline in poverty levels between 1993 and 
1998.  
 
With commune prices, the CDF for the predicted expenditure lies below the CDF for 
initial expenditure in 1993
52, though with unit values, per figure 6b, the predicted CDF is 
virtually indistinguishable from the CDF of the initial per-capita expenditure. Thus with 
commune prices, the results show that poverty did decline with liberalization of the rice 
sector, and this result is independent of any poverty line used.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper started out by asking how trade liberalization affects household welfare, 
income distribution and poverty in a developing country with a large rural economy in the 
presence of imperfect labor markets. Vietnam provided a unique opportunity to examine the 
ex-post impact of liberalization of its largest sector, i.e. rice on household well being, by virtue 
of a panel household survey that spanned a period of market reforms, in which agricultural 
trade reforms played a significant role.  The lifting of rice export quotas, which by 1998 were 
no longer binding, contributed to increased real consumer and producer rice prices, by about 
18 percent or 30 percent between 1993 and 1998, depending on the choice of price measures. 
Import quotas for chemical fertilizers, a key input in rice production, were also relaxed, which 
drove deflated prices down by 18 percent over this period. 
 
Methodologically, this paper moves beyond the common assumption of perfect labor 
markets and the use of first-order responses, and instead explicitly accounts for labor market 
imperfections and second-order responses by producers and consumers in reacting to rice and 
fertilizer price changes. Estimating structural parameters of a multi-output production 
function enabled an assessment of the cost of household labor employed on the family farm. 
This was achieved by computing the shadow wage or marginal product of family adult 
equivalent labor. I find that rural household members are employed intensively on their farms, 
perhaps due to a combination of limited market opportunities and underemployment, which is 
                                                 




reflected in very low ratios of their shadow wage to the prevailing market wage rate. The 
production function is also used to construct a profit function which then determines the 
variation in farmer’s profitability in response to exogenous changes in rice and fertilizer prices 
while incorporating the endogenous response in the household’s shadow wages to changes in 
rice prices. 
 
The results point to a modest increase in average household welfare for Vietnam, 
though this masks clear differences between rural and urban households. The outcomes are 
qualitatively similar though smaller in magnitude when prices derived from unit values are 
used instead of those obtained from price questionnaires. This indicates that welfare estimates 
are sensitive to the choice of price measures, though it cannot be concluded that the use of 
unit values would consistently understate the magnitudes of welfare outcomes. 
 
Rural households across the income distribution experienced an increase in their 
welfare, with poor rural households gaining more as a fraction of their initial real income, 
relative to better-off rural households. This was also reflected in the reduction of poverty 
incidence by 9 percentage points among rural households. By contrast, urban households saw 
a drop in their welfare, though marginally, with the poorest urban households being the 
hardest hit.  
 
I also find that the inequality of farm income rose slightly after the respective price 
changes, which confirms earlier work that agriculture reforms did not aggravate overall 
income inequality over this period in Vietnam. Agricultural trade reforms can explain about 
half of the decline in poverty among farmers, who are mainly of rural origin. However, 
national poverty rates fell marginally with the liberalization of the rice and fertilizer market, 
which necessitates caution in attributing trade liberalization or more generally market reforms 
in the rice and fertilizer sector as contributing significantly to poverty reduction in Vietnam. 
Broad based economic growth between 1993 and 1998 played a prominent role in reducing 
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Table 1 Vietnam: Percentage Change in Real Prices from 1993 to 1998 
Household Category 








% Chg. In 
Chemical 
Fertilizer Price 
Vietnam 33.4  31.2  -18.3 
 North  27.8  27.0  -20.6 
 South  40.1  36.3  -14.6 
        
Location      
 Urban  29.2  24.1  -17.9 
 Rural  34.4  32.9  -18.3 
        
Region      
 Northern  Uplands  27.6  17.7  -17.0 
 Red  River  Delta  26.0  28.9  -19.4 
 North  Central  Coast  31.3  33.5  -26.6 
  South Central Coast  42.5  34.8  -18.6 
 Central  Highlands  41.8  42.2  0.3 
 South  East  43.9  36.0  -13.4 
  Mekong River Delta  36.4  36.5  -15.5 
                 
Source: Calculated from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey, 1993 and 1998 
 
Notes: 
1.  Consumer and producer rice price changes are based on average prices 
recorded at the commune level in the VLSS community price questionnaires. 
2.  Fertilizer prices are average unit values calculated at the commune level. 
3.  There were 150 communes in 1993. Three were not revisited in 1998 and 2 
communes were split in 1998, resulting in 151 communes used for tracking 















Elasticity of rice 
demand with 
respect to rice 
price 
Derived Hicksian 
elasticity of rice 
demand with 
respect to rice 
price 
Northern Mountain  0.42  -0.88  -.074 
Red River Delta  0.43  -0.92  -.078 
North Central Coast  0.38  -0.87  -.075 
South Central Coast  0.20  -0.97  -.92 
Central Highlands  0.39  -1.02  -.89 
South East  0.01  -1.12  -1.12 
Mekong River Delta  0.13  -1.01  -0.98 
 
Sources: 
Marshallian demand elasticities are from Minot and Goletti (1997) which are obtained 
by estimating an Almost-Ideal demand system using Vietnam Living Standard Survey 
















































1.  Compensating variation is expressed as a percentage of initial 
household expenditure in 1993 expressed in 1998 VND after deflating 
by regional and monthly price indices. 
 
Table 3 Vietnam: Compensating Variation
Household Category











Northern Uplands 5.5 33.7
Red River Delta 7.6 33.0
North Central Coast 8.5 31.9
South Central Coast 6.7 24.6
Central Highlands 10.3 30.9
South East 4.5 17.0
Mekong River Delta 6.0 22.2
Income group
1
st quartile 10.0 41.4
2
nd quartile 7.8 33.4
3
rd quartile 5.8 24.8
4








































1.  Dependent variable is a constructed CET index of agricultural outputs at the household level using  1 . 1 = σ . 
2.  All regression include commune dummies and dummies for zero input values. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors for the pooled estimates are corrected for clustering at the commune level.  R squares for random and 
fixed effects are for within variation. 
3.  * indicates significance at the 10% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level  and *** at the 1% level of confidence. 
Table 4 Vietnam:  CET-CD Agriculture Production Function 
Log family adult male equivalent hours 0.075 *** (0.02) 0.075 *** (0.01) 0.049 *** (0.02)
Log hired labor hours 0.064 *** (0.02) 0.064 *** (0.01) 0.040 ** (0.02)
Log chemical fertilizer  0.209 *** (0.02) 0.208 *** (0.01) 0.167 *** (0.02)
Log organic fertilizer 0.076 *** (0.02) 0.077 *** (0.01) 0.101 *** (0.01)
Log insecticide 0.039 ** (0.02) 0.039 *** (0.01) 0.035 *** (0.01)
Log capital stock 0.049 *** (0.01) 0.049 *** (0.01) 0.029 *** (0.01)
Log area cultivated 0.398 *** (0.05) 0.398 *** (0.01) 0.378 *** (0.02)
Log private services value 0.061 *** (0.02) 0.061 *** (0.01) 0.061 *** (0.01)
Log government services value 0.049 ** (0.02) 0.049 *** (0.01) 0.050 *** (0.01)
Fraction of land irrigated -0.093 (0.06) -0.092 *** (0.03) -0.002 (0.04)
fraction of poor quality land -0.093 (0.06) -0.092 *** (0.03) -0.073 * (0.04)
% poor land * %  irrigated 0.144 * (0.08) 0.143 *** (0.05) 0.046 (0.06)
fraction of good quality land 0.131 (0.12) 0.133 (0.08) 0.306 *** (0.10)
% good land * %  irrigated -0.120 (0.13) -0.122 (0.08) -0.334 *** (0.11)
Female head -0.039 ** (0.02) -0.040 ** (0.02) -0.051 (0.05)
Farm experience 0.003 * (0.00) 0.003 ** (0.00) 0.004 *** (0.00)
Farm experience squared 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Some primary education -0.022 (0.03) -0.022 (0.02) -0.002 (0.04)
Completed primary  school 0.000 (0.04) -0.001 (0.03) -0.069 (0.05)
Some lower secondary education 0.045 (0.03) 0.045 * (0.02) 0.041 (0.04)
Completed lower secondary sch. 0.017 (0.03) 0.016 (0.02) -0.003 (0.04)
Some upper secondary education 0.067 * (0.04) 0.067 ** (0.04) 0.023 (0.06)
Completed upper secondary sch. 0.072 * (0.04) 0.071 ** (0.03) -0.048 (0.06)
Attended vocational school 0.036 (0.04) 0.035 (0.03) -0.079 * (0.05)
Attended university 0.224 ** (0.08) 0.223 *** (0.07) 0.058 (0.12)
No. of times crop loss dues to floods  0.003 (0.07) 0.003 (0.02) 0.010 (0.02)
No. of  times crop loss due to pests 0.037 (0.04) 0.037 ** (0.01) 0.030 ** (0.01)
No. of times crop loss due to droughts -0.005 (0.05) -0.005 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01)
No.of  times crop loss due to other factors -0.037 (0.06) -0.036 ** (0.02) -0.031 (0.02)
dry season  dummy -0.149 *** (0.05) -0.149 *** (0.02) -0.150 *** (0.02)
year dummy 0.063 (0.05) 0.063 *** (0.02) 0.081 *** (0.02)
constant -1.682 *** (0.27) -1.678 *** (0.13) -0.588 *** (0.19)
R-squared
No. of obs/households 6410/3205 6410/3205 6410/3205
OLS-Pooled Random Effects Fixed Effects




















































1.  All regression includes commune dummies and dummies for zero input values. Education attainment 
variables were omitted for space reasons. Standard errors are in parentheses R squares are for 
within variation. 
2.  Instruments for adult equivalent labor hours are young males  between ages 15 and 25, male and 
female adults above 25 and below 64 and elders above the age of 64. 
3.  *indicates significance at the 10% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level  and *** at the 1% level of 
confidence. 
Table 5 North & South Vietnam:  CET-CD Agriculture Production Function (Fixed Effects-IV)
Log family adult equivalent hours - - - 0.191 ** (0.08) - - - 0.193 ** (0.09)
Log hired labor hours - - - - - - 0.023 (0.03) 0.068 *** (0.02)
Log chemical fertilizer  0.069 *** (0.02) 0.131 *** (0.02) 0.150 *** (0.03) 0.152 *** (0.03)
Log organic fertilizer 0.087 *** (0.02) 0.099 (0.02) -0.012 (0.03) 0.079 *** (0.03)
Log insecticide 0.038 ** (0.02) 0.009 *** (0.02) 0.022 (0.03) 0.067 *** (0.02)
Log capital stock 0.020 (0.01) 0.035 *** (0.01) 0.025 * (0.02) 0.006 (0.01)
Log area cultivated 0.235 *** (0.03) 0.337 *** (0.03) 0.067 *** (0.02) 0.333 *** (0.02)
Log private services value -0.056 *** (0.02) 0.120 ** (0.02) 0.001 (0.03) 0.059 ** (0.03)
Log government services value 0.044 ** (0.02) 0.039 (0.02) 0.044 (0.03) 0.071 ** (0.03)
Fraction of land irrigated -0.132 ** (0.06) 0.054 (0.05) 0.096 (0.06) 0.098 (0.06)
fraction of poor quality land -0.062 (0.05) -0.022 (0.05) 0.259 *** (0.07) -0.067 (0.07)
% poor land * %  irrigated 0.083 (0.11) -0.127 (0.09) -0.235 ** (0.11) 0.121 (0.10)
fraction of good quality land 0.077 (0.17) -0.174 (0.14) -0.072 (0.17) 0.625 *** (0.16)
% good land * %  irrigated 0.002 (0.18) 0.067 (0.15) 0.095 (0.19) -0.594 *** (0.17)
Female head -0.170 ** (0.07) 0.006 (0.06) -0.135 (0.09) -0.068 (0.09)
Farm experience 0.012 *** (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.016 *** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
Farm experience squared 0.000 *** (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 *** (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
No. of times crop loss  -floods  0.055 * (0.03) 0.015 *** (0.02) 0.145 *** (0.05) -0.046 (0.05)
No. of  times crop loss - pests 0.007 (0.02) 0.083 ** (0.01) -0.137 *** (0.05) -0.196 *** (0.05)
No. of times crop loss  - droughts -0.112 *** (0.02) -0.048 ** (0.02) 0.057 *** (0.03) 0.082 *** (0.03)
No.of  times crop loss  - other factors 0.014 (0.03) -0.050 *** (0.02) 0.000 (0.05) 0.073 (0.05)
dry season  dummy 0.109 *** (0.02) -0.277 *** (0.02) 0.160 *** (0.04) -0.017 (0.04)
year dummy 0.073 *** (0.03) 0.123 *** (0.02) -0.205 *** (0.05) 0.015 (0.05)
No. of young males 0.185 *** (0.02) - - - 0.215 *** (0.03) - - -
No. of male adults 0.216 *** (0.04) - - - 0.213 *** (0.04) - - -




North Vietnam South Vietnam
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Fixed Effects-IV
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1.  The shadow wage is the implicit daily wage for adult male equivalent family labor. 
2.  Market  wage  is adult male daily agricultural wage rate obtained from the VLSS 
community questionnaire. It is the average rates paid for planting, harvesting and 
clearing. 
 
Table 6: Ratio of Estimated Shadow Wage to Market Wages 








Less than 0.2 0.18 0.16
0.2 to 1.0 0.21 0.19
> 1.0 to 2.5 0.24 0.33
more than 2.5 0.30 0.47
Region
Northern Uplands 0.20 0.15
Red River Delta 0.25 0.19
North Central Coast 0.17 0.15
South Central Coast 0.16 0.19
Central Highlands 0.13 0.24
South East 0.20 0.27

































































1.  Dependent variable is the computed marginal revenue product of adult equivalent family labor or shadow wage. 
2.  Standard errors are in parentheses. R square is for within variation. 
3.  * indicates significance at the 10% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level  and *** at the 1% level of confidence. 
Table 7 North & South Vietnam: Shadow Wage Regression (Fixed Effects)
Log paddy price 0.418 *** (0.10) -0.072 (0.16)
Log other food price -0.032 (0.06) 0.073 (0.07)
Log annual crop price 0.120 ** (0.05) 0.160 *** (0.06)
Log perennial crop price 0.244 *** (0.02) 0.239 *** (0.05)
Log fruit crop price 0.225 *** (0.05) 0.038 (0.08)
Log chemical fertilizer price 0.179 *** (0.07) 0.312 *** (0.12)
Log organic fertilizer price -0.002 (0.02) 0.038 (0.03)
Log insecticide price 0.024 (0.02) 0.111 *** (0.04)
Log area cultivated 0.228 *** (0.02) 0.370 *** (0.02)
Log capital service 0.012 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
Log real private services 0.166 *** (0.02) 0.126 *** (0.02)
No. of infants -0.028 (0.02) -0.043 * (0.02)
No. of child -0.047 *** (0.01) -0.055 *** (0.02)
No. of young male adults -0.185 *** (0.02) -0.188 *** (0.03)
No. of young female adults -0.138 *** (0.02) -0.212 *** (0.03)
No. of male adults -0.151 *** (0.03) -0.099 ** (0.04)
No. of female adults -0.179 *** (0.03) -0.230 *** (0.04)
Female head 0.142 ** (0.06) 0.073 (0.08)
Farm experience -0.007 *** (0.00) -0.012 *** (0.00)
Farm experience squared 0.000 ** (0.00) 0.000 *** (0.00)
Some primary education -0.064 (0.05) 0.038 (0.07)
Completed primary  school -0.146 ** (0.06) 0.020 (0.09)
Some lower secondary education 0.068 (0.05) 0.015 (0.08)
Completed lower secondary school -0.047 (0.05) 0.016 (0.11)
Some upper second education 0.023 (0.07) 0.492 *** (0.15)
Completed upper secondary school -0.088 (0.06) 0.058 (0.15)
Attended vocational training -0.117 ** (0.05) -0.074 (0.12)
Attended university -0.124 (0.13) 0.060 (0.25)
Fraction of land irrigated 0.149 *** (0.05) 0.045 (0.06)
fraction of poor quality land 0.044 (0.05) -0.373 *** (0.07)
% poor land * %  irrigated -0.207 ** (0.10) 0.343 *** (0.10)
fraction of good quality land -0.349 ** (0.15) 0.539 *** (0.16)
% good land * %  irrigated 0.181 (0.16) -0.526 *** (0.17)
Dry season dummy -0.327 *** (0.02) -0.151 *** (0.04)
No. of times crop loss - floods  0.020 (0.02) -0.227 *** (0.05)
year dummy 0.122 ** (0.07) 0.334 *** (0.08)
constant -2.606 *** (0.24) -3.329 *** (0.31)
R-squared
No. of obs/households
North Vietnam South Vietnam
3926/ 1963 2460/ 1230
0.37 0.57
























































1.  First scenario looks at the change in paddy price alone. Second scenario incorporates the general 
equilibrium effect of paddy price changes on shadow wages. The third scenario builds on the second 
and includes the effect of chemical fertilizer price changes. Profits are expressed as a percentage of 
initial household expenditure in 1993 expressed in 1998 VND after deflating by regional and monthly 
price indices and correcting for outliers.
Table 8: Predicted Change in Real Farm Profits from 1993 to 1998
Household Category 1st Scenario 2nd Scenario 3rd Scenario
Vietnam 61.4 58.2 69.0
North 45.2 40.1 49.1
South 87.9 87.9 101.6
Location
Urban 20.7 20.0 29.4
Rural 64.0 60.7 71.5
Region
Northern Uplands 43.7 38.5 47.4
Red River Delta 45.0 40.1 47.7
North Central Coast 47.3 41.9 53.1
South Central Coast 112.7 112.7 128.5
Central Highlands 50.3 50.3 51.1
South East 105.4 105.4 119.6
Mekong River Delta 74.6 74.6 89.2
Farm size (Hectares)
Less than 0.2 47.1 43.9 52.8
0.2 to 1.0 66.3 62.8 74.0
>1.0 to 2.5 67.8 66.3 78.5
more than 2.5 66.2 65.9 79.2
Income group
1st quartile 61.7 57.5 67.9
2nd quartile 57.9 54.2 65.0
3rd quartile 62.8 60.3 71.2
4th quartile 64.8 63.4 74.5



























































Note: The change in welfare is expressed as a percentage of initial household expenditure in 1993 
expressed in 1998 VND after deflating by monthly and regional price indices and correcting for 
outliers.  
Table 9 Vietnam: Welfare Effect of Trade Liberalization in Rice between 1993 and 1998 
Household Category Average Poor NonPoor 1993 (Predicted) 1998
Vietnam 8.96 11.37 5.78 59.70 52.72 37.37
North 10.17 13.10 4.16 71.07 62.79 44.33
South 7.48 8.06 6.85 45.79 40.39 30.03
Location
Urban -1.49 -2.05 -1.29 26.04 26.25 8.90
Rural 11.68 12.70 10.10 68.45 59.60 44.65
Region
Northern Uplands 11.63 13.32 5.92 77.11 67.85 56.38
Red River Delta 9.47 14.08 3.01 64.42 55.59 32.64
North Central Coast 9.79 11.31 5.41 76.49 70.38 48.09
South Central Coast 10.75 14.62 7.05 48.96 42.18 35.21
Central Highlands -1.65 -2.73 0.62 67.80 66.10 52.40
South East 1.90 2.84 1.39 34.96 32.52 70.62
Mekong River Delta 10.02 8.37 11.18 47.42 40.61 36.92
Household Head
 Male 9.90 12.34 6.37 63.08 55.22 39.90
Female 6.46 8.13 4.61 50.71 46.06 28.17
Occupation
NonFarmer -3.60 -6.70 -2.33 28.95 30.86 19.46
Farmer 12.62 13.59 11.15 68.67 59.09 48.19
FarmSize (Hectares)
Less than 0.2 5.36 7.37 2.95 68.10 63.80 36.80
0.2 to 1.0 14.98 15.86 13.06 72.27 61.17 49.63
>1.0 to 2.5 16.33 15.51 16.88 55.15 41.23 35.06
more than 2.5 17.78 13.63 19.46 28.79 18.18 17.96
Overall Income group
1st quartile 11.87 11.87 - 100.00 99.40
2nd quartile 10.81 10.68 - 100.00 86.16
3rd quartile 9.24 9.87 8.85 38.78 25.28
4th quartile 3.91 - 3.91 0.00 0.00
Urban Income group
1st quartile -3.20 -3.20 - 100.00 100.00
2nd quartile -1.35 -1.35 - 100.00 98.32
3rd quartile -1.56 -2.12 -1.33 28.70 30.56
4th quartile -1.28 - -1.28 0.00 0.00
Rural  Income group
1st quartile 12.82 12.82 - 100.00 99.36
2nd quartile 12.20 12.05 - 100.00 84.77
3rd quartile 11.71 11.78 11.65 41.08 24.08
4th quartile 8.66 - 8.66 0.00 0.00































Table 10 Vietnam: Poverty  Effect of Trade Liberalization in Rice between 1993 and 1998 
Household Category 1993 Estimated 1998 1993 Estimated 1998 1993 Estimated 1998
Vietnam 59.70 52.72 37.37 19.68 16.70 9.54 8.55 7.06 3.55
North 71.07 62.79 44.33 23.99 19.56 11.24 10.38 7.98 4.04
South 45.79 40.39 30.03 14.41 13.21 7.74 6.31 5.94 3.04
Location
Urban 26.04 26.25 8.90 6.72 7.14 1.69 2.53 2.77 0.50
Rural 68.45 59.60 44.65 23.05 19.19 11.54 10.12 8.18 4.33
Region
Northern Uplands 77.11 67.85 56.38 27.41 21.98 15.90 12.44 9.42 6.10
Red River Delta 64.42 55.59 32.64 20.57 16.67 7.28 8.48 6.49 2.44
North Central Coast 76.49 70.38 48.09 26.44 22.16 11.84 11.58 9.11 4.07
South Central Coast 48.96 42.18 35.21 16.60 14.15 10.63 7.82 6.47 4.72
Central Highlands 67.80 66.10 52.40 24.55 26.49 19.10 12.10 13.93 9.57
South East 34.96 32.52 7.62 9.92 9.84 1.34 4.07 4.20 0.37
Mekong River Delta 47.42 40.61 36.92 14.44 12.90 8.15 5.98 5.60 2.67
Household Head
 Male 63.08 55.22 39.90 20.84 17.45 10.26 9.05 7.36 3.84
Female 50.71 46.06 28.17 16.61 14.71 6.92 7.21 6.26 2.52
Occupation
NonFarmer 28.95 30.86 19.46 8.55 9.85 4.34 3.60 4.41 1.46
Farmer 68.67 59.09 48.19 22.93 18.70 12.68 9.99 7.83 4.81
FarmSize (Hectares)
Less than 0.2 68.10 63.80 36.80 23.26 21.31 10.31 10.43 9.38 4.31
0.2 to 1.0 72.27 61.17 49.63 24.27 18.84 12.83 10.47 7.56 4.74
>1.0 to 2.5 55.15 41.23 35.06 16.77 13.38 8.13 7.36 5.91 2.84
more than 2.5 28.79 18.18 17.96 6.51 5.13 2.18 2.12 1.71 0.43
Overall Income group
1st quartile 100.00 99.40 51.08 45.47 27.12 22.80
2nd quartile 100.00 86.16 25.16 19.31 6.87 5.22
3rd quartile 38.78 25.28 2.46 2.01 0.21 0.22
4th quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Urban Income group
1st quartile 100.00 100.00 49.21 50.81 25.01 26.73
2nd quartile 100.00 98.32 22.56 23.64 5.64 6.37
3rd quartile 28.70 30.56 1.74 2.47 0.14 0.28
4th quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rural  Income group
1st quartile 100.00 99.36 51.20 45.14 27.25 22.55
2nd quartile 100.00 84.77 25.46 18.81 7.01 5.08
3rd quartile 41.08 24.08 2.63 1.90 0.22 0.21
4th quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Head Count (P0)         
%  
Poverty Gap (P1)         
%  














log per-capita exp. in 1993
 CV: commune price  CV: unit value
































Change in Predicted Profits
log per-capita exp. in 1993
 Profit: Commune Price  Profit: Unit Value

































Net Welfare Gain: Vietnam
log per-capita exp. in 1993
 Welfare Gain: commune price  Welfare Gain: unit value





























Net Welfare Gain: Rural Vietnam
log per-capita exp. in 1993
 Welfare Gain: commune price  Welfare Gain: unit value









Figure 4a Vietnam: Surface plot of joint density of net welfare gain as a % of initial expenditure and 




Figure 4b Vietnam: Contour plot of joint density of net welfare gain as a % of initial expenditure and 





Figure 5a Vietnam: Surface plot of joint density of net welfare gain as a % of initial expenditure and 
log of per-capita expenditure using unit values 
 
 
Figure 5b Vietnam: Contour plot of joint density of net welfare gain as a % of initial expenditure and 











Cumulative Distribution Fn below 2,000k VND: Commune Price Change
Expenditure per capita: 1998 VND
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Cumulative Distribution Fn below 2,000k VND: Unit Value Change
Expenditure per capita: 1998 VND
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